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I. Introduction
Suppose you are a laboratory biologist studying a new ingredient for an antacid when you discover that the
substance has a curious side eect: no matter how much you feed the lab rats, they do not gain weight.
Skeptically, you think this must be a uke, or maybe that the new ingredient is eating away the rats' insides.
But then you set up some controlled experiments and nd that it was not a uke. The drug stabilizes the
rats' body fat levels and leaves them otherwise healthy. Realizing you may have stumbled upon the greatest
pharmaceutical discovery in history, along with untold fame and fortune, you set up a company that will
dwarf Microsoft. You call your startup \Newco" to confuse the corporate lawyers and concoct the crafty
marketing name \Taferomon" for your miracle drug.1 Taferomon has so much potential that you have no
trouble with the greedy venture capitalists. Money is not a problem and human clinical trials prove that
Taferomon is eective and has just a few minor side eects. Thus after ying through all three phases of
Food and Drug Administration (\FDA") approval in eight years, Taferomon is about to hit the shelves and
Newco has gone public.
1Course paper for Food and Drug Law, Harvard Law School, Mr. Peter Barton Hutt, March 5, 2001.
1Note that read backwards, Taferomon is \no more fat." The author cannot claim full credit for this ingenuity; inspiration
came from an early competitor of the hair growth stimulant Rogaine which called itself Riahom, or backwards, \mo hair." See
Upjohn Co. v. Riahom Corp., 641 F. Supp. 1209, 1216 (D.Del. 1986).
1At breakfast one morning though you open the newspaper and turn on CNBC to see what the Street has
to say about Newco. Instead of rosy predictions you see a newspaper advertisement touting a new miracle
weight loss pill that works even better than Taferomon and a television commercial for a fat-reducing cream
based on the same active ingredient as Taferomon. You know these claims, and a host of others that will
follow, cannot all be true and that these y-by-night companies must be violating some FDA regulations.
But you also know that having those products and claims about your product out on the market for just
a few months can kill your prots. So although you immediately have your lawyers asking the FDA to
take action, the agency may be unable or unwilling to respond. The lawyers suggest that you may have a
better alternative: bringing a Lanham Act unfair competition action against your competitors. Rather than
relying on FDA enforcement, increasing numbers of food, drug, cosmetic, and medical device manufacturers
in your position have used the Lanham Act to obtain prompt relief from false or misleading claims about
their products or a competitor's products.
II. Regulatory and Statutory Background
A. Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (\FDCA")2 authorizes the FDA to regulate the labeling and
marketing of foods, drugs, cosmetics, and medical devices. While the FDA exclusively regulates both la-
221 U.S.C. xx 301-397 (2000).
2beling and advertising for prescription drugs, however, the Federal Trade Commission (\FTC") regulates
advertising for over-the-counter (\OTC") drugs, food, and cosmetics.3 Enforcement authority under the
FDCA lies with the government: \[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b) [regarding suits brought by states],
all such proceedings for the enforcement, or to restrain violations, of [the FDCA] shall be by and in the
name of the United States."4 Thus if a rm believes that a competitor is violating the FDCA and thereby
disadvantaging the complaining rm in the market or infringing its economic rights, \the indicated rst step
is a complaint to the FDA."5
Although a rm might succeed in persuading the FDA to pursue an enforcement action, the agency may
not have the resources to do so even in a meritorious case. Throughout the FDA's history, budgetary
considerations have limited the agency's regulatory activity, particularly regarding economic violations of
the FDCA.6 \Perhaps in an eort to justify budget increases (or at least to prevent further budget cuts),
the agency has forthrightly stated that it simply will not enforce certain parts of the act."7 Beyond concerns
about limited resources, the FDA may have little interest in pursuing certain violations.8 Moreover, an
aggrieved rm cannot challenge an FDA refusal to take action because the agency has complete discretion.
3See FDA-FTC Memorandum of Understanding, 36 Fed. Reg. 18,539 (Sept. 16, 1971).
421 U.S.C. x 337(a) (2000).
5Thomas J. McGrew & Donald O. Beers, When the FDA Takes No Action Against Violations of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, Can a Private Cause of Action Be Brought Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act?, 47 Food & Drug
L.J. 1 (1992).
6From FY 1998 to FY 1999, FDA product seizures dropped from 35 to 25. Injunctions were also down, from 11 in 1998 to
eight in 1999, and there were no prosecutions in either year. See James G. Dickinson, Less FDA Enforcement/Surveillance in
1999, Medical Marketing & Media, June 1, 2000, at 30. These decreases were \presumably the result of successive annual
\level funding" budgets from Congress." Id.
7Peter Barton Hutt, FDA Reduces Economic Regulation of Food Industry, Legal Times of Washington, Aug. 30, 1981,
at 31.
8Comparative claims and negative advertisements, for example, may be of little signicance to the FDA. \For example,
while a company may be signicantly injured by a competitor misrepresenting its FDA compliance status, the FDA is unlikely
to use its resources against this competitor." Jerey N. Gibbs, Medical Device Promotional Activities and Private Litigation,
47 Food & Drug L.J. 295, 296 (1992).
3In Heckler v. Chaney,9 the Supreme Court held that an FDA refusal to take requested enforcement actions
is not subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Predictably, rms have tried to enforce the FDCA privately but that approach also has failed. Although
all federal appellate courts have not considered the issue, it has become well established that the FDCA
does not create a private cause of action.10 Some courts have noted that Congress \considered and rejected
a version [of the FDCA] which would have allowed a private cause of action for damages."11 One court
reasoned that if it recognized such a right,
\the major advantages of enforcement through the [FDA] would be lost, including expertise, ability to solicit
comment from appropriate sources, direct representation of the public interest, and a unitary enforcement
policy."12 Courts also have held that there is no implied private cause of action to enforce the FDCA under
state law.13
B. Lanham Act
Nevertheless, rms like our hypothetical Newco with millions of dollars at stake have increasingly decided
9470 U.S. 821 (1985).
10See, e.g., PDK Labs, Inc. v. Friedlander, 103 F.3d 1105, 1113 (2d Cir. 1997); Bailey v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 965, 967 (6th
Cir. 1995); Gile v. Optical Radiation Corp., 22 F.3d 540, 544 (3rd Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 965 (1994); Mylan Lab.,
Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1197 (1994); Pacic Trading Co. v. Wilson & Co.,
547 F.2d 367, 370 (7th Cir. 1976). In Merrell Dow Pharm. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986) (holding that there is no federal
jurisdiction where a plainti asserts an FDCA violation as an element of a state cause of action), the parties agreed with the
lower court that there was no private cause of action so the Supreme Court assumed that was correct for the purposes of its
opinion.
11Bailey, 48 F.3d at 968, quoting National Women's Health Network, Inc. v. A.H. Robins Co., 545 F. Supp. 1177, 1179 (D.
Mass. 1982).
12Id., quoting National Women's Health Network, 545 F. Supp. at 1180.
13See, e.g., Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Provini Veal Corp., 626 F. Supp. 278, 283 (D. Mass. 1986), a'd mem., 802
F.2d 440 (1st Cir. 1986) (stating that a state \cannot confer on private persons the power to enforce a federal statute whose
enforcement Congress left to federal administrative agencies").
4that they cannot rely on the possibility of FDA enforcement and therefore turned to the Lanham Act14 as
a private self-help remedy. The Lanham Act provides companies a powerful tool for relief against unfair
competition. Most pertinently, section 43(a) of the Lanham Act states that:
(1) Any person who... uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device... or
any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact, which...
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteris-
tics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, services,
or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes
that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.15
Under this provision, a company can sue a competitor16 for false claims regarding the goods or services of
either party.17
A plainti bringing a conventional Lanham Act claim based on false or misleading advertising must prove ve
elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that the defendant made false or misleading statements;
(2) that there is actual deception or at least a tendency to deceive a substantial portion of the intended
audience; (3) that the deception is material in that it is likely to inuence purchasing decisions; (4) that
the goods traveled in interstate commerce; and (5) that there is a likelihood of injury to the plainti in
1415 U.S.C. xx 1051-1072, 1091-1096, 1111-1129 (2000).
16Although consumers do not have standing to sue under section 43(a), the public's interest in truthful advertising nevertheless
can be advanced through the competitor's eorts to prevent false or misleading statements. In Coca-Cola Co. v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 822 F.2d 28, 31 (6th Cir. 1987), for example, the court stated that \[p]rotecting consumers from false or misleading
advertising... is an important goal of the [Lanham Act] and a laudable public policy..." See also Charles J. Walsh & Marc S.
Klein, From Dog Food to Prescription Drug Advertising: Litigating False Scientic Establishment Claims Under the Lanham
Act, 22 Seton Hall L. Rev. 389, 411-412 (1992).
17This was claried by a 1988 amendment. Prior to 1988, some courts interpreted section 43(a) to apply only to misrepre-
sentations about one's own products. See, e.g., McNeil-P.C.C., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 938 F.2d 1544, 1549 n.1 (2d
Cir. 1991).
5terms of reduced sales, loss of good will, and other factors.18 If the plainti can prove, however, that the
challenged claim is literally false, \a court may grant relief without considering whether the buying public
was misled."19
Because Lanham Act plaintis believe their competitors' marketing campaigns are injuring them in the
marketplace, they frequently ask for temporary restraining orders, expedited discovery, and preliminary
injunctions. The result is \fast-paced litigation" that tends \to proceed much faster than other civil litigation
because the goal is to obtain prompt relief."20 As one court noted about an antacid maker who was
challenging a rival's product eectiveness claims, the plainti \seeks what it normally promises to provide {
fast and eective relief."21 Section 34(a) of the Lanham Act authorizes the court to enjoin false or misleading
statements.22Asdiscussedin
Section IV, infra, however, courts have exercised their equitable powers under that provision to order a wide
range of remedies.
III. Limitations On Lanham Act Claims
Courts will not use their remedial powers, however, to step into the FDA's shoes to enforce the FDCA. \It
18See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v. BreathAsure Inc., 204 F.3d 87, 91-92 (3d Cir. 2000); Summit Tech., Inc. v. High Line
Med. Instruments Co., 933 F. Supp. 918, 929 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
19Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharm. Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm., Inc., 19 F.3d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1994).
The Second Circuit, where many of these cases are tried, boils the analysis down to the following:
[A] plainti must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that an advertisement is either literally false or that the
advertisement, though literally true, is likely to mislead consumers.... Where the advertising claim is shown to be literally false,
the court may [grant relief] without reference to the advertisement's impact on the buying public.
McNeil-P.C.C., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 938 F.2d at 1549.
20Gibbs, supra note 8, at 300.
21Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharm. Co., 2000 WL 1946673 at *1 (D.N.J.
Dec. 22, 2000).
22Section 34(a) of the Lanham Act provides: \The... courts... shall have power to grant injunctions, according to the
principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem reasonable, to prevent... a violation [of section 43(a)]." 15
U.S.C. x 1116(a) (2000).
6is not for a court to force the FDA to interpret, apply, and enforce its regulations in a manner determined
by the court to fairly eectuate the [FDCA's] policies."23
A. Implied Statements of FDA Approval Generally Not Actionable
Returning to the Taferomon example, assume that Quckco markets a weight control pill that has not been
approved by the FDA but claims to have the same properties as Taferomon.24 Newco would not succeed
on a Lanham Act claim suggesting that the act of placing the drug on the market implies falsely that the
Quackco drug has proper FDA approval.25 In Mylan Laboratories, Inc. v. Matkari,26 a drug manufacturer
failed in such a claim against generic drug makers because the plainti did not point to any armative
misrepresentations of FDA approval by the defendants. The court found Mylan's theory \too great a stretch
under the Lanham Act," reasoning that allowing such a theory would \in eect, permit Mylan to use the
Lanham Act as a vehicle by which to enforce the [FDCA]."27 A section 43(a) plainti must \point to some
claim or misrepresentation that is reasonably clear from the face of the [oending] advertising or package
inserts."28
This requirement may be met, however, if the competitor's statement \comes very close" to a \bald rep-
resentation of FDA approval."29 In Summit Technology, Inc. v. High Line Medical Instruments,30 for
example, an ophthalmological laser manufacturer sued an importer of such systems who made statements
23Sandoz Pharm. Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 902 F.2d 222, 231 (3d Cir. 1990), citing Cutler v. Kennedy, 475 F. Supp.
838, 856-57 (D.D.C. 1979).
24The hypothetical examples used here are simplied for illustrative purposes; presumably, in some of the situations proposed
the FDA would use its enforcement powers to protect public health.
25See Mylan Lab., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1197 (1994).
26Id.
27Id. (noting also that Mylan \is not empowered to enforce independently the FDCA").
28Id.
29Summit Tech., Inc. v. High-Line Med. Instruments, Co., 933 F. Supp. 918, 936 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
30Id.
7in a press release regarding FDA approval of certain devices made by the plainti. The defendant did not
provide a qualication noting that those devices mentioned were not the same as the devices marketed by
the defendant, thereby leaving a false impression that the defendant was selling FDA-approved devices.31
By allowing Summit's claim, the court thus found that High Line's statements crossed the line between a
failure to disclose non-approval, as in Mylan, and an armative representation of approval.
Employing a theory similar to that used by the Mylan and Summit plaintis, the plainti in Lymphomed,
Inc. v. Professional Compounding Centers of America, Inc.,32 alleged that the defendant's false \statement"
was the act of doing business in violation of the FDCA.33 Lymphomed, manufacturer of the orphan drug
pentamidine, brought suit against the defendant, whose employees were selling ingredients for pentamidine
to pharmacists and representing to them that compounding the orphan drug was lawful. Lymphomed's
lawyers later noted that:
It seemed clear that [the defendant's] shipment of pentamidine directly violated the FDCA.
Although the FDA agreed to investigate,... there is a long time... between investigation...
and... regulatory action. Indeed, there was no assurance that the FDA would ever take
regulatory action. Lymphomed concluded that, given the commercial environment, it could
not wait to see whether the FDA would eventually take action.34
Although the court granted an injunction in Lymphomed, it did so based on pentamidine's orphan drug
status.35 Mylan would appear to preclude Lymphomed's theory because the plainti did not point to a clear
false or misleading representation. Indeed, even the Lymphomed court itself stated that: \There is clearly
no private right of action for [the defendants] not having complied with the [FDCA] to ship the drug. The
question here is [the plainti's orphan drug] exclusivity.... Nobody chartered [the plainti] to protect the
31See id.
32Civ. No. H-89-1792 (S.D. Tex. May 23, 1989).
33See McGrew, supra note 5, at 5.
35See Gibbs, supra note 8, at 303.
8public."36
B. Claim Cannot Require Original Interpretation of FDCA
A complicating factor in the Lymphomed suit was that the parties sharply disputed whether the defendant
had directly violated the FDCA.37 This illustrates why courts have imposed another limitation on Lanham
Act plaintis: a section 43(a) claim cannot require original interpretation of the FDCA. That is the role of
the FDA, not the court in a private litigation.
Suppose Quackco markets as a dietary supplement a product that has chemical properties similar to Tafer-
omon. A court would be unlikely to nd Quackco in violation of section 43(a). Analogous circumstances
led to Lanham Act litigation in Braintree Laboratories, Inc. v. Nephro-Tech, Inc.38 In that case, the
defendant Nephro-Tech marketed a \dietary supplement" with the same active ingredient as the plainti's
kidney disease drug. Braintree argued that Nephro-Tech's \dietary supplement" designation was a false or
misleading statement violating section 43(a). Because the case turned on the statutory denition of \dietary
supplement," the court found that Braintree's claim was a \classic misbranding [claim]... solely for resolution
by the FDA."39 As the court noted, \even if it were determined in litigation that [defendant's drug] did not
meet some independent, lay understanding of the term \dietary supplement,"defendants might not be able
to remove the term from its label without violating the FDCA."40
36Lymphomed, No. H-89-1792, quoted in Gibbs, supra note 8, at 303.
37See Gibbs, supra note 8, at 307 n.40.
381997 WL 94237 at *1 (D. Kan. Feb. 26, 1997).
39Id. at *7.
40Id.
9Similarly, the Third Circuit refused to encroach on FDA turf in Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Richardson-
Vicks, Inc.41 There, the defendant had made claims that the demulcents in its Pediatric 44 cough syrup,
which the defendant had listed as inactive ingredients, enabled the medicine to work immediately after
swallowing. The plainti alleged that the demulcents therefore should be listed as active ingredients as per
FDA regulations and that the defendant violated section 43(a) by not listing them as such. Ruling that
the defendant's labeling was not false, the court reasoned that \[t]he FDA has not found conclusively that
demulcents must be labeled as active or inactive ingredients... [and] the agency should be given the rst
chance to exercise [its] discretion or to apply [its] expertise."42 \[W]hat the [FDCA] and the FTC Act do not
create directly, the Lanham Act does not create indirectly, at least in cases requiring original interpretation
of these Acts or their accompanying regulations."43 Furthermore, the Sandoz court recognized the dilemma
faced by a plainti seeking redress for a competitor's FDCA violations but indicated that the Lanham Act
is not the solution:
Sandoz is free to petition the FDA to investigate these alleged labeling violations. Sandoz
represents that it has embarked upon this path already. The fact that it has been unable
to get a quick response from the FDA, however, does not create a claim for Sandoz under
the Lanham Act.44
C. Claim Can Succeed If Direct Interpretation Of FDCA Is Not Required
Nevertheless, a false or misleading statement is actionable under the Lanham Act even if it violates the
41902 F.2d 222 (3d Cir. 1990).
42Id. at 230-31 (noting also that the plainti's \position would require [the court] to usurp administrative agencies' respon-
sibility for interpreting and enforcing potentially ambiguous regulations").
43Id. at 231. See also Summit Tech., Inc. v. High-Line Med. Instruments, Co., 933 F. Supp. 918 (C.D. Cal. 1996). The
Summit Technology court upheld Lanham Act claims based on whether the parties' medical devices were \identical," whether
the defendants' devices had FDA approval, and whether a defendant's machine was new because those claims demanded factual
inquiries that did not require the court to \tread on the FDA's exclusive domain." Id. at 935, 936, 940. However, the court
dismissed claims that involved inquiring into whether the FDA permitted certain uses of the defendants' devices because those
claims were \far more nebulous." Id. at 936.
10FDCA. In Mylan, for example, the court allowed an allegation that the defendant's \bioequivalence" claim
was false or misleading, even though FDA regulations dened that term, because the plainti pleaded
\suciently particularized" facts to support its claim.45 Likewise, the plainti in Grove Fresh Distributors,
Inc. v. Flavor Fresh Foods, Inc.,46 asserted an independent basis for its claim. The defendant represented
its product as \100% orange juice from concentrate" even though it contained various additives.47 Although
FDA regulations dened \orange juice from concentrate," Grove Fresh \relie[d] on the [denition] merely to
establish the standard or duty which defendants allegedly failed to meet."48
IV. Lanham Act Cases Regarding Performance And Ecacy Claims
A majority of Lanham Act cases brought against food and drug companies, however, involve competitor's
statements regarding the performance or ecacy of one or both of the party's products. Product claims
take several forms. A scientic establishment claim, for example, \represents that there is scientic evidence
which establishes the truth of the statement."49 A non-establishment claim, on the other hand, includes
an objective representation about a product without an express representation that some scientic evidence
supports the statement.50 Some claims regard the superiority of one product over another;51 others simply
refer to desired qualities a product purports to possess.52
45Mylan Lab., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1138 (4th Cir. 1993).
46720 F. Supp. 714, 716 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
47Id.
48Id. at 716. Similarly, the court in Potato Chip Institute v. General Mills, Inc., 461 F.2d 1088 (8th Cir. 1972), found
that the phrase \potato chip" was misleading when used by the defendant to describe its product which was made of both raw
potatoes and dehydrated potatoes. Because \the past experience of the consumer so shades the term [\potato chip"] with a
raw potato overlay," thus establishing an independent basis for the plainti's claim, the lower court's discussion regarding the
applicable FDA regulations was irrelevant. Id. at 1089, 1090 n.1.
49Thompson Med. Co. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 643 F. Supp. 1190, 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). See also Walsh, supra note 16, at
419-420 (noting that Thompson Med. Co. marked the entrance of the concept of an establishment claim into Lanham Act
jurisprudence).
50See Walsh, supra note 16, at 420.
51See, e.g., Procter & Gamble v. Cheesebrough-Pond's, Inc., 747 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1984) (regarding hand and body lotion
superiority claims such as, \relieves dry skin better than any leading lotion").
52See, e.g., Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharm. Co., 2000 WL 1946673 at *1
(D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2000) (challenging the accuracy of the name of defendant's Mylanta Night Time Strength antacid).
11A. Plainti's Burden
Although the FTC has authority to nd that an inadequately substantiated advertising claim regarding an
OTC drug is deceptive or misleading,53 \[a] Lanham Act plainti, on the other hand, is not entitled to
the luxury of deference to its judgment."54 \The burden of proving \literal falsity" varies depending on
the nature of the challenged claim."55 For non-establishment claims, where the defendant does not refer
to scientic tests or studies, \each plainti bears the burden of showing that a challenged advertisement is
false or misleading, not merely that it is unsubstantiated by acceptable tests or other proof."56 For estab-
lishment claims, however, a plainti can prove literal falsity by demonstrating that the relied upon studies
\are not suciently reliable to permit one to conclude with reasonable certainty that they established" the
challenged claim.57 Furthermore, some courts hold that a product claim may be found \false by necessary
implication."58
If the plainti can establish that a product claim is literally false, then the court may grant relief without
53See 15 U.S.C. x x 45 & 52 (2000); see also Sandoz Pharm. Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 902 F.2d 222, 227 (3d Cir.
1990).
54Sandoz, 902 F.2d at 228.
55Zeneca Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 1999 WL 509471 at *31 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 1999).
56Procter & Gamble Co. v. Cheesebrough-Pond's, Inc., 747 F.2d at 119. See also Sandoz, 902 F.2d at 228. A recent case,
however, picked up on an issue left unaddressed in Sandoz and suggested that a completely unsubstantiated advertising claim
can violate the Lanham Act even without proof that consumers were actually misled. See Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v.
Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharm. Co., 2000 WL 1946673 at *9 (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2000) (applying this principle
where the advertiser relied on \pure speculative hypothesis" and did \not appear to have at least some semblance of support"
for its claim).
57McNeil-P.C.C., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 938 F.2d 1544, 1549 (2d Cir. 1991).
58Novartis, 2000 WL 1946673 at *10-11 (nding the product name \Mylanta Night Time Strength" false by necessary
implication where the company making the claim presented no evidence to show that the antacid was formulated specically
for night use). See also Warner-Lambert Co. v. BreathAsure, Inc., 204 F.3d 87, 92 (3d Cir. 2000) (nding the trade name
BreathAsure false by necessary implication because the products so named were ineective in reducing bad breath). But see
Novo Nordisk A/S v. Becton Dickinson and Co., 997 F. Supp. 470, 473 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (distinguishing Third Circuit law
and stating that \claims of implicit falsity belong within the \likely to mislead and confuse" category of claims").
12considering whether consumers were misled.59 If however the challenged claim is literally true, then the
plainti must show that it is nevertheless likely to confuse or mislead consumers.60 This is accomplished
through the use of consumer surveys to show actual consumer confusion or deception.61
Some courts have adopted a presumption shifting the burden of proof to the defendant where the plainti
can show that the defendant intended to mislead the public.62 Before invoking this presumption, however,
the plainti must prove that the defendant's conduct was \deliberate" and of an \egregious nature."63 Thus
in Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharmaceuticals Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.,64 even though the plainti presented evidence that the defendant's \strongest antacid there is" claim
intended to mislead, the defendant's conduct did not rise to the level of deliberate and egregious conduct.
The court held that the plainti's evidence of intent \only show[ed] an intent to mislead, or to create a
misleading halo eect, of a kind that is unfortunately common in the antacid industry."65
B. Literally False Product Claims
1. Weak Scientic Support
Suppose Quackco markets a drug under the less subtle name \Male Gut Reducer" that like Taferomon
59See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v. BreathAsure, Inc., 204 F.3d at 92; McNeil-P.C.C., 938 F.2d at 1549.
60See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharm. Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm., Inc., 19 F.3d 125, 129 (3d
Cir. 1994); McNeil-P.C.C., 938 F.2d at 1549.
61See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharm. Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm., Inc., 19 F.3d at 129-130. A
plainti \cannot obtain relief by arguing how consumers could react; it must show how consumers actually do react." Sandoz
Pharm. Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 902 F.2d 222, 229 (3d Cir. 1990).
62See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharm. Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 19 F.3d at 131-32; Johnson &
Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharm. Co. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 960 F.2d 294, 298-99 (2d Cir. 1992).
63Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharm. Co. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 960 F.2d at 298-99.
6419 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 1994).
65Id. at 132.
13stabilizes, but does not reduce, body fat levels. Newco asserts, however, that Quackco's product is in no
way specially-formulated for men and that although it may stabilize, it does not reduce fat. Newco would
have a strong section 43(a) case based on these facts. In Warner-Lambert Co. v. BreathAsure, Inc.,66
for example, the plainti, a manufacturer of various breath freshening products, challenged the defendant's
trade name \BreathAsure" because the name \implies assurance where there is no basis for it."67 At trial,
the defendant stipulated that scientic studies demonstrated that its products were not eective in reducing
bad breath. Because it was uncontested that the defendant's ecacy claim had no scientic basis, the court
found the trade name literally false.68 Similarly, the court in Upjohn Co. v. Riahom Corp.69 also used a
lack of scientic foundation to nd false the defendant's claim that its hair growth treatment promoted hair
growth. The defendant admitted to the court, however, that its product merely \promotes a fuller, thicker
head of hair and nourishes the scalp."70 In a much dierent context, Ralston Purina claimed that its Puppy
Chow dog food can reduce the severity of canine hip dysplasia.71 Ralston's competitor, Alpo, brought a
Lanham Act suit alleging that the claim was based on bad science. The court agreed and found Ralston's
claim false.72
2. The Role of FDA Findings
More recently, a court has considered the fact that the FDA has not approved a drug claim as \persuasive
66204 F.3d 87 (3d Cir. 2000).
67Id. at 90.
68Id. at 96.
69641 F. Supp. 1209 (D. Del. 1986).
70Id. at 1224. The court also stated that the defendant's claim that its minoxidil-containing product was a cosmetic may
have been literally false because the FDA had decided that any minoxidil compound promoted for hair growth is a drug. See
id. at 1223.
71See Alpo Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
72Among other things, Ralston's scientists had \improperly combined unrelated data to attain statistical signicance, ignored
warnings... concerning the validity of its data, discarded inconsistent results, failed to properly control variables, failed to
properly select test animals, and failed to establish accurate methods of testing for [canine hip dysplasia]." Walsh, supra note
16, at 427. See also Pzer, Inc. v. Miles, Inc., 868 F. Supp. 437 (D. Conn. 1994). The Pzer court found a study used as
the basis for an establishment claim unreliable \because of the absence of a written protocol and scientic controls, including
blinding, to ensure objectivity and accuracy of the data." Id. at 457. The same court also found a literal falsity where Pzer
used an article comparing its drug to a drug made by the competitor to establish that Pzer's drug was superior to a dierent
drug made by the competitor. Id. at 454-55.
14evidence" that a defendant's claim to the contrary is false. In Zeneca Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co.,73 Zeneca,
maker of the breast cancer drug tamoxifen, sued Eli Lilly for making false claims pertaining to breast cancer
prevention about its osteoporosis drug Evista. Evista had FDA approval for osteoporosis claims but not for
breast cancer prevention claims. The court considered this relevant to its analysis:
The fact that the FDA has not approved [Evista] for breast cancer risk reduction does
not conclusively demonstrate that the defendant's claim that [Evista reduces] the risk of
breast cancer is literally false under the Lanham Act because a... plainti must prove that
the defendant's ecacy claims are literally false, not simply that they fail to meet current
federal licensing standards. However,... FDA's conclusion [in FDA documents] that \[t]he
eectiveness of [Evista] in reducing the risk of breast cancer has not yet been established"
is persuasive evidence that Eli Lilly's claims to the contrary are untrue.74
Conversely, courts have held that FDA approval of a claim can be a defense to a section 43(a) suit. In Cytyc
Corp. v. Neuromedical Systems, Inc.,75 for example, rival manufacturers of cervical cancer detection devices
disputed several product claims. Although the challenged product claims did \not correspond precisely to
statements that the FDA has approved, [they were] similar enough to the approved statements for the [c]ourt
to conclude, as a matter of law, that they are neither false nor misleading."76 And in another case, American
Home Products Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson,77 the court stated that: \If FDA approval of the precise label
used by a drug manufacturer is a defense to a consumer's product liability action, it should be, a fortiori,
a defense to a competitor's action under the Lanham Act."78 Therefore if an incredulous competitor sued
731999 WL 509471 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 1999).
7512 F. Supp.2d 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
76Id. at 301.
77672 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
78Id. at 144. In a somewhat disturbing case, Pzer representatives told pharmacists that a competitor's hypertension
15Newco under section 43(a) for claiming that Taferomon stabilizes body fat levels, Newco would have a strong
defense.79
C. Deceptive or Misleading Product Claims
Imagine, however, that Newco advertises Taferomon as the \strongest" weight control drug available, and
that a competitor cannot prove this statement literally false because Taferomon indeed has a higher labo-
ratory \fat stabilization" rating than the competitor's product. The competitor nevertheless may attempt
to show that Newco's statement is deceptive or misleading because it implies that Taferomon is the most
eective weight control drug, whereas the fat stabilization rating does not correspond to eectiveness. John-
son & Johnson tried that approach when it disputed Rorer's claim that Extra Strength Maalox Plus is the
\strongest antacid there is."80 Because the statement was literally true based on laboratory tests for acid
neutralization capacity, Johnson & Johnson oered consumer surveys to show that the product claim was
misleading.81 Based on ndings that only 7.5% of responses linked strength to superior relief, the court held
that there was insucient evidence of deception.82
However, \[t]he probative value of a consumer survey is a highly fact-specic determination and a court may
medication can cause patients to die or become ill, despite the fact that the FDA had approved the drug as safe and eective.
See Pzer, Inc. v. Miles, Inc., 868 F. Supp. 437, 460 (D. Conn. 1994). Not surprisingly, the court found those statements by
Pzer representatives to be literally false and hence actionable under section 43(a). See id.
79Cf. Glaxo Warner-Lambert OTC G.P. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharm. Co., 935 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y.
1996). In Glaxo Warner-Lambert, the plainti's heartburn medicine had FDA approval for statements regarding relief, while
the defendant's heartburn medicine had FDA approval for statements regarding both relief and prevention. The court held that
the defendant did not violate section 43(a) by instructing consumers through advertisements to read the labels to learn that
the plainti's medicine does not prevent heartburn. To hold otherwise would \eliminate the need for plainti to obtain FDA
approval for labeling regarding heartburn prevention." Id. at 331.
80See Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharm. Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm., Inc., 19 F.3d 125, 132-36 (3d Cir.
1994).
81See id.
82See id. at 133-134 (noting that a Lanham Act plainti must show that the advertising \tends to deceive or mislead a
substantial portion of the intended audience") (emphasis added).
16place such weight on survey evidence as it deems appropriate."83 Accordingly, one court recently stated that
\[i]t is well established... that 25% is a sucient level of confusion,"84 while other courts have found that
23% confusion, 85 or even 15.5% confusion,86 can support a section 43(a) claim.
IV. Remedies Awarded In Lanham Act Cases Against Food And Drug Companies
Lanham Act plaintis typically seek injunctions to stop their competitors from making oending false or
misleading statements. Courts also have authority under the Lanham Act to award damages, although that
power is rarely invoked in these cases.87 Using their equitable discretion, however, courts have fashioned
various other forms of relief.
One such remedy is corrective advertising, which is frequently awarded where the defendant targets its
advertising toward doctors and other medical professionals.88 In Energy Four, Inc. v. Dornier Medical Sys-
tems, Inc.,89 for example, the manufacturer of refurbished electrodes for lithotripsy machines sued a leading
supplier of such machines after the latter company distributed a brochure claiming that the refurbished elec-
trodes had caused an \implosion and serious equipment damage." After nding this statement false under
section 43(a), the court ordered that a court-prepared notice be sent to all users of lithotripsy machines that
83American Home Prods. Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 871 F. Supp. 739, 760 (D.N.J. 1994). Moreover, the court stated,
\[s]urveys must have certain hallmarks of reliability," such as a representative sample and properly trained surveyors, and they
must meet objective surveying and statistical standards. Id. at 760-61 (internal citation omitted).
84Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharm. Co., 2000 WL 1946673 at *14 (D.N.J.
Dec. 22, 2000).
85McNeilab v. American Home Prods. Corp., 501 F. Supp. 517, 525, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
86Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 690 F.2d 312, 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
87See 15 U.S.C. x 1117(a) (2000). See also Alpo Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
88See generally Thomas C. Morrison, Corrective Advertising As a Remedy for the False Advertising of Prescription Drugs
and Other Professionally-Promoted Medical Products, 49 Food & Drug L.J. 385 (1994).
89765 F. Supp. 724 (N.D. Ga. 1991).
17could use the refurbished electrodes. Among other statements, the notice included a notice that there was
\absolutely no evidence" regarding the claimed implosion. The court also included a disclaimer, noting that,
\[t]he court expresses no opinion on the relative merits of new and refurbished electrodes or on whether
or not it is within the standard of care prevailing in your communities to use refurbished electrodes."90
Similarly, in the Alpo Petfoods case regarding Ralston's claims relating to canine hip dysplasia, the court
ordered Ralston \to prepare and disseminate to those who received information concerning its [canine hip
dysplasia] claims [i.e., veterinarians] a corrective release in terms and in form to be approved by this court."91
Courts have also required training sessions with employees of companies making false or misleading product
claims as a remedy for those Lanham Act violations. The court in Zeneca, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Company,92
for example, ordered the defendant to design and implement a training program for its sales representatives
\to ensure that [they] are made aware of and adhere to [the court's] decision and order and do not make
claims in the eld that [Evista] has been proven to reduce the risk of breast cancer or that it is comparable or
superior to tamoxifen."93 The court in Pzer, Inc. v. Miles, Inc.,94 likewise ordered Pzer to hold training
sessions with its sales representatives so that they were \made fully of aware of the ndings" of the court
that Pzer had violated section 43(a).95
Courts have also exercised their discretion to order product recalls and to order the cancellation of out-
standing orders. In Upjohn Co. v. Riahom Corp.,96 the court ordered the defendant to recall its product
and oending promotional materials that were in the possession of its packagers and sales representatives.
90Id. at 733-735. See also Morrison, supra note 88, at 392-394.
91Alpo Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 720 F. Supp. 194, 215 (D.D.C. 1989).
921999 WL 509471 at *42 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 1999).
93Id.
94868 F. Supp. 437 (D. Conn. 1994).
95Id. at 461.
96641 F. Supp. 1209, 1226-27 (D. Del. 1986).
18The court further required the defendant to cancel outstanding orders, to send a letter to customers who
had outstanding orders, and to stop soliciting new orders until the company prepared new packaging and
promotional materials.97 Another court stopped short of a recall but ordered a defendant to send a letter
\to all to whom [its mascara which claimed to be waterproof but was found not to be] has been distributed
directing them to withhold further sales of [the mascara]."98
V. Conclusion
The Lanham Act provides a exible self-help remedy to food and drug companies that are harmed by unfair
competition in the marketplace. But is it desirable for private litigation to become the de facto regulation
of the industry? In an FDA regulation concerning a warning on OTC drug labels, the agency asserted that
\it is in the best interest of the consumer, industry, and the marketplace to have uniformity in presentation
and clarity of message."99 However, increased regulation through private litigation can send a muddled and
inconsistent message to food and drug companies. Moreover, as one commentator wrote:
Lanham Act litigation is no panacea. Although the goal is to obtain quick relief, that
outcome is not always achieved. A court may not grant a broad enough injunction to
truly benet the plaintis. Cases can become bogged down in discovery, which can quickly
escalate litigation costs. Counterclaims are a common tactic. The plainti may not only
lose its case, but it risks a counterattack against its own advertising. Legal fees can be quite
high.100
One party in the American Home Products Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson101 case suggested to the court
97See id.
98Maybelline Co. v. Noxell Corp., 643 F. Supp. 294 (E.D. Ark. 1986), rev'd, 813 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1987) (reversing because
venue was improper).
9950 Fed. Reg. 51,400, 51,402 (1985).
101672 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
19that a Lanham Act plainti acts as a \vicarious avenger of the public's right to be protected from false
advertising."102 But as the court recognized, that party was not \suing... merely to vindicate the public
interest in drug labeling."103 The company had its business interests in mind, and in that case was even
asking for damages. This is why the role of the FDA enforcement cannot be pushed aside, or replaced by
private litigation. \An action under the Lanham Act... is not the proper legal vehicle in which to vindicate
the public's interest in health and safety."104 Although many of the cases discussed herein involved disputes
over product claims that did not place public health at risk, ensuring truthful labeling and advertising for
food and drugs nevertheless plays a vital role in protecting public health and safety.
Surveys have repeatedly shown that Americans have great faith in the FDA.105 While recognizing that
budgetary limitations will always preclude the FDA from pursuing every violation, the agency, and not the
courts, should be the foremost avenger of the public's right to healthy and safe food and drugs. Lanham
Act litigation, on the other hand, should remain a powerful tool for redressing economic harms.
102Id. at 145 (internal quotation marks omitted).
103Id.
104Id. (citation omitted).
105Peter Barton Hutt & Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law: Cases and Materials { Second Edition, 18-19
(1991) (stating that the public, \according to repeated... surveys, rates FDA among the federal agencies in which they have
the greatest condence").
20